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Informational cascades can occur when rationally acting individuals decide independently of their private information and follow the decisions of
preceding decision-makers. In the process of updating beliefs, differences in the weighting of private and publicly available social information may
modulate the probability that a cascade starts in a decisive way. By using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined neural activity while
participants updated their beliefs based on the decisions of two fictitious stock market traders and their own private information, which led to a final
decision of buying one of two stocks. Computational modeling of the behavioral data showed that a majority of participants overweighted private
information. Overweighting was negatively correlated with the probability of starting an informational cascade in trials especially prone to conformity.
Belief updating by private information was related to activity in the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the
parietal cortex; the more a participant overweighted private information, the higher the activity in the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and the lower
in the parietal-temporal cortex. This study explores the neural correlates of overweighting of private information, which underlies the tendency to start an
informational cascade.
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INTRODUCTION
Research in the social sciences has reliably demonstrated that individ-
uals are influenced by the behavior of others (e.g. Cialdini and
Goldstein, 2004; Raafat, Chater, and Frith, 2009). Stock market bub-
bles, for example, can emerge when traders start to follow misleading
decisions made by their colleagues, disregarding their own private in-
formation. Interestingly, theoretical and empirical work in economics
has shown that initial decisions of others can create an environment in
which it is even rational for subsequent decision-makers to disregard
their own private information and to follow others. Such a pattern of
conforming decisions is called an informational cascade (Banerjee,
1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Anderson and Holt, 1997). Usually,
informational cascades lead to a desired outcome. However, a ‘reverse’
cascade can arise if a substantial number of initial decision-makers
receive an incorrect private signal and therefore make incorrect deci-
sions. In such situations, all subsequent decision-makers would ration-
ally follow the initial decisions and ignore their own private signals.
The theory of informational cascades can explain numerous real-life
phenomenon, such as nonemployment in the labor market
(Oberholzer-Gee, 2008), revolutionary regime transitions (Ellis and
Fender, 2011), and financial crises (Chari and Kehoe, 2004). The prob-
ability that a cascade starts strongly depends on how people weight and
integrate their own private as compared with publicly available social
information (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; No¨th and Weber, 2003;
Goeree et al., 2007). In the present work we define social information
broadly as information that is inferred from the behavior of other
people without necessarily interacting with them face-to-face. In the
experiment we used a hypothetical decision scenario. In contrast to
social information, private information is directly accessible to a
person. Weizsa¨cker’s (2010) meta-analysis suggests that people tend
to overweight private as compared with social information, even in
situations in which following others is beneficial. Due to overweighting
of private information, cascades might occur less often as predicted by
the theory of informational cascades. Here, we combine neurobio-
logical, economic and computational approaches to investigate the
neural mechanism of (biased) belief updating during financial deci-
sions and to explore individual differences in the weighting and pro-
cessing of private information, which can modulate the frequency of
starting a cascade.
The neural underpinnings of decision-making in a social context and
the impact of social information has received increasing attention in the
neuroscience literature (Behrens et al., 2008; Klucharev et al., 2009;
Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma and
Adolphs, 2013). From a cognitive perspective, informational cascades
are based on a process of sequential belief updating of social and private
information, on which a final decision under uncertainty rests. Recent
studies in the field of decision neuroscience provide evidence for the
involvement of the anterior insula (Preuschoff et al., 2006, 2008), the
anterior insula in combination with the inferior frontal gyrus (Paulus
et al., 2003), the posterior fronto-median cortex (Volz et al., 2003, 2004)
and the parietal cortex, often in combination with the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC) (Huettel et al., 2005; Vickery and Jiang, 2009;
Mohr et al., 2010; Stern et al., 2010; Symmonds et al., 2011; Wright et al.,
2012), in belief updating and decision-making under uncertainty [see
Bach et al., 2011 for an overview]. Whereas the inferior parietal lobule
(angular gyrus) seems to have a special role in tracking observed relative
frequencies of events, activity within a region of the inferior frontal
gyrus has been found to be negatively correlated with Bayesian posterior
probability (d’Acremont et al., 2013).
Contrary to other paradigms exploring belief updating (e.g. the evi-
dence accumulation task; Stern et al., 2010 or the ball/bin betting task
by d’Acremont et al., 2013), informational cascades require people not
only to update a belief on the basis of (private) information, but
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additionally to derive social information from the observed decisions
of others. A better understanding of the differences in updating private
as compared with social information is crucial for the theory of infor-
mational cascades, because overweighting of private information can
result in fewer cascades than predicted by the theory. Here we explored




Thirty-two people recruited from the subject pool of the University of
Basel participated in our experiment. Five participants were excluded
from the final data analysis (two because of technical problems during
the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data acquisition,
one because of a technical error in the experimental script, one because
of misuse of the response device, and one because of left-handedness).
The final sample consisted of 27 healthy right-handed participants with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision (mean age¼ 22.4 years, 2.0
years s.d., 20–29 years, 9 females). The study was approved by the
local ethics committee and participants gave written informed consent.
Participation in the study was reimbursed with a fixed amount of 30
Swiss franc (CHF) and a variable bonus (mean bonus¼ 3.99
CHF, 0.42 CHF s.d., 2.90–4.60 CHF). The variable bonus was per-
formance contingent, so that deviations from the correct probability
estimate led to a lower bonus following a nonlinear quadratic scoring
rule (Selten, 1998).
Experimental design
We used a hypothetical decision scenario representing an adapted ver-
sion of the classical informational cascades paradigm (Anderson and
Holt, 1997). In our study, participants acting as stock market traders
were required to repeatedly choose the profitable (‘good’) of two stocks
(W or S) given some evidence e. Participants were told that stock
markets are very volatile and fast-moving and that every week (trial)
only one stock is profitable. At the end of each trial, participants
reported the posterior probability p goodje 
t
that the chosen stock
was ‘good’ (Figure 1). In the 32 experimental trials, participants se-
quentially received three different pieces of evidence. At the beginning
of a trial, two decisions made by other fictitious traders (trader I and
II) in the ‘Swiss Capital Bank’ were shown, representing ‘social infor-
mation I’ and ‘social information II’. The ‘social information’ was
followed by ‘private information’ in the form of a personal recommen-
dation from a rating agency. Participants were informed that all other
traders also received their own personal recommendation from an
independent rating agency. The likelihood pðejgoodÞt of receiving a
correct recommendation from a rating agency was 2/3 (indicated by
the visual cue: ‘þ’) or 4/5 (visual cue: ‘þþ’) for all traders and for the
participant. The quality (‘þ’ or ‘þþ’) of the recommendations
received was indicated on the screen above the decisions of the other
traders (social information I and II) or above the private information
for the participant. The posterior probability that one of the two stocks
was profitable (‘good’) given the received and perceived evidence can










þ p badjeð Þt1 pðejbadÞt
; ð1Þ
where t refers to the three different points in time in the belief updating
process (Figure 1). At t¼ 0 without a participant having received any
information p goodje 
t¼0 ¼ 0.50. Based on the assumption that other
traders incorporated all available evidence, participants could derive
the recommendation received by other traders. Because trader I always
received low (‘þ’) quality recommendations, her decision (social in-
formation I) signaled the correct stock with a likelihood of 0.67 [i.e.
p ejgood ¼ 0.67]. Next, trader II was confronted with a recommenda-
tion of either low (‘þ’) quality [i.e. p ejgood ¼ 0.67] or high (‘þþ’)
quality [i.e. p ejgood ¼ 0.80]. This evidence could then be combined
with the information inferred from the decision of the first trader,
which led to four possible posterior probabilities of the chosen stock
by trader II (i.e. 0.50; 0.67; 0.80; 0.89). After receiving a personal rec-
ommendation (private information) participants could update their
belief, which should correspond to six different posterior probabilities
(i.e. 0.50; 0.67; 0.80; 0.89; 0.94; and 0.97). Importantly, by using all
different combinations of decisions and private information
(2 4 4¼ 32 trials of interest), we created a design matrix in
which the different pieces of evidence are independent, that is,
seeing one piece of evidence did not allow the prediction of the next
piece of evidence. To force participants to pay equal attention to social
and private information and to update their probability estimate at
every point in time (t), we included six filler trials in the task. In these
Fig. 1 Informational cascades task trial structure. The decisions of trader 1 (social information I) and trader 2 (social information II) were followed by a buying recommendation of a rating agency for one or the
other stock (private information). At the end of every trial, participants decided which stock (W or S) provided the higher revenue and indicated the probability of the correct outcome (probability judgment).
The different windows were separated with fixation crosses (see ‘experimental design’ section for details).
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trials, subjects had to make a decision with only one (social informa-
tion I) or two (social information I & II) pieces of evidence and no
private information. To familiarize themselves with the task, partici-
pants completed 11 training trials outside of the scanner before the
fMRI session. To further boost their attention, filler trials were over-
represented in these training trials. The randomized sequence of trials
was identical for all subjects. Trials were separated with fixation
crosses, as were the different events within a trial (Figure 1). The
interstimulus intervals between the time windows were varied accord-
ing to a left truncated Poisson distribution [mean ()¼ 3172.78 ms,
min¼ 1000 ms, max¼ 8000 ms]. Importantly, from a normative
Bayesian perspective, the first two decision-makers can create a
situation in which the third decision-maker (and all subsequent deci-
sion-makers) should ignore private information and just follow the
decisions of others. Thus, the decision of the third decision-maker is
crucial, as it can start or prematurely end an informational cascade.
Therefore, in our paradigm we investigated the cognitive and neural
mechanisms underlying the process of belief updating and decision-
making of the third decision-maker, who can initiate or end an infor-
mational cascade.
Behavioral data analysis
To examine whether participants differentiated between the six differ-
ent posterior probabilities (i.e. p goodje 
t¼3 ¼ 0.50, 0.67, 0.80, 0.89,
0.94 and 0.97), we performed a one-way repeated measures analysis
of variance with the six levels of uncertainty as within-subject factor
and the average probability judgments as the dependent variable. The
same analysis was conducted with the logarithm of the reaction times
as dependent measure.
Conformity index
The experimental design matrix included six ‘conflicting’ trials in
which the two pieces of social information suggested buying the
same stock, whereas the private information suggested buying the
other stock and where the normatively correct decision was consistent
with the social information and opposite to the private information.
Therefore, we calculated a ‘conformity index’ for every participant,
defined as the percentage of decisions in line with the decision of
the others in these specific trials.
Computational models
To explain the cognitive process underlying belief updating, we con-
structed an ‘Evidence Model’ that represents a modification of the
model proposed by Hung and Plott (2001). According to the norma-
tive Bayesian solution (Equation 1), a participant is required to update
her prior belief with every new piece of evidenceet presented at t. To
simplify the Bayesian solution, Equation 1 can be transformed by
computing the log odds ratio of the posterior probabilities of which
of the two stocks being the profitable one (‘good’) assuming equal













However, people might not follow the Bayesian solution and might
weight their private information more heavily than the socially inferred
information. To identify how people weight the different pieces of
information, we extended Equation 2 by allowing pieces of informa-
tion to be weighted differently, that is,
Y






where 0 represents a bias for one of the two stocks at t¼ 0 and t
refers to the weight given to the different pieces of information. If all
weights are equal to 1 and 0 ¼ 0 then Equation 3 is identical to
Equation 2, that is, the normative solution is nested within the
Evidence Model specified by Equation 3.
When estimating the Evidence Model (see Supplementary
Methods), we also imposed three different constraints on the model
parameters. First, in the full model (FM) we estimated one bias par-
ameter 0 and three different t weights for each piece of information
at the three points in time (social information I, social information II
and private information), providing four parameters. Second, for the
social model (SM), we assumed no bias (i.e. 0 ¼ 0) and one single
weight for social information (i.e. t¼1 ¼ t¼2) and one weight for
private information (i.e. t¼3), leading to a total of two free param-
eters. Third, we also determined the goodness-of-fit of the normative
Bayesian model (BM) by setting 0 ¼ 0 and all other weights to 1 (i.e.
t ¼ 1). Whereas the BM has no flexibility in weighting information
differently, the FM allows weighting each piece of information in a
different way. The SM assumes that people do not have a bias for one
of the options, treat both pieces of social information equally but
weight their private information differently. The SM is more complex
than the BM but less complex than the FM.
Information weighting index
A decision-maker following Bayesian principles should weight the
social and private information equally. To examine to what extent
participants deviated from the Bayesian approach, we determined an
information weighting index for the SM by dividing the estimated
weight for the private information (t¼3, i.e. using the mode of the
marginal posterior distribution as a point estimate) by the sum of the
estimated weights for the private and social information (i.e.
t¼3 þt¼1þ2). An information weighting index >0.50 indicates over-
weighting of private as compared with social information, whereas
values of <0.50 indicate overweighting of social as compared with
private information.
Functional imaging data analyses
To study the neural underpinnings of belief updating with social and
private information, two first level models were calculated in the con-
text of a Generalized linear model (GLM) (SPM8, Wellcome Trust
Center for Neuroimaging, University College London). Our experi-
mental design is characterized by three updating stages (Figure 1). In
every trial, participants were forced to update their belief p goodje 
t
after the decisions of two traders (social information I & II) and after
they had received their own private information.
We computed how much a signal given at t¼ 2 increased/decreased
the belief in the option that was more probable at stage t¼ 1 following
the Bayesian solution (i.e. Equation 1). Likewise, we determined the
difference of the posterior probability between t¼ 2 and t¼ 3. Please
note that as the decision of trader 1 was always based on a low (þ)
quality signal for either stock W or S. Belief updating from t¼ 0 (i.e.
the beginning of a trial) to t¼ 1 was the same for every trial and
therefore not explicitly modeled.
First level analysis
In the ‘first level model 1’, belief updating at the social information II
(belief updating by social information) and at the private information
(belief updating by private information) stages was modeled with a
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single parametric regressor to account for general effects of belief
updating at both stages (i.e. independent of the social or private
nature of the information). Brain activity at the time of the decision
and at the time of the probability judgment was modeled with separate
parametric regressors tracking the log odds of the probability judg-
ments and the decision for either stock W or S. We also included
parametric regressors coding for the stock with the highest posterior
probability (at t¼ 1 and t¼ 2 and 3 combined) and for the quality of
the private information [low (þ) or high (þþ)] at t¼ 2 and 3 com-
bined. Decision and/or probability judgment time windows in which
participants gave no answer and filler stimuli were included in the
GLM as regressors of no interest.
In the ‘first level model 2’, the second (social information II) and
third (private information) belief updating stages were modeled sep-
arately using parametric regressors to account for the specific effects of
belief updating by social and private information. The quality of the
private information [low (þ) or high (þþ)] was included as a para-
metric regressor for the belief updating stage at t¼ 3. In all other
respects, first level models 1 and 2 were similar. To account for head
movements, both first level models included motion parameters.
Second level analysis
To test for the general (first level model 1) and specific (first level
model 2) effects of belief updating as well as for the effects of an
increase in subjective uncertainty during decision-making (first level
model 2  see supplementary fMRI results) we used one-sample t-tests
on the group level (P< 0.001, uncorrected with a minimum cluster size
of 20 voxels). To test how belief updating by private information was
modulated by interindividual differences in information weighting, we
used a multiple regression design (P< 0.001 or 0.005, uncorrected)
with the ‘information weighting index’ as a covariate. To restrict the
search volume only to brain regions involved in belief updating by
private information we used the results of the respective second level
analysis as an explicit mask (P< 0.005, uncorrected with a minimum
cluster size of 20 voxels). To further illustrate these findings, we ex-
tracted the contrast estimates within two Region of interest (ROI)s
(Figure 5) and plotted them against the information weighting
index. The ROIs were defined with the MarsBaR toolbox for
Statistical parametric mapping (SPM) (Brett et al., 2002).
RESULTS
Behavioral results
Overall, participants performed the task consistent with the Bayesian
solution: in 93.18% of all trials in which participants (N¼ 27) made a
decision, they decided in accordance with the Bayesian solution, with
seven participants always choosing the more profitable stock. The six
different levels of uncertainty significantly modulated participants’
probability judgments, F(3.64, 94.51)¼ 70.28, P< 0.001 (see Figure 2
for details), with the probability judgments as dependent variable and
the six levels of uncertainty as independent variable. The reaction times
did not differ significantly between the six levels of uncertainty, F(2.59,
67.44)¼ 1.57, P¼ 0.21.
Model comparison and parameter estimation
To further explore how participants weighted the different types of
information in belief updating, we compared the three different
models described above according to their Deviance information cri-
terion (DIC) values (see Supplementary Methods for details on model
estimation and model comparison). The SM, which assumes a differ-
ential weighting of social as compared with private information, per-
formed best (DICFM minus SM ¼ 10.4; DICBM minus SM ¼ 1590.4). This result
was further supported by an analysis at the individual level: the Bayes
factors favored the SM as compared with the FM for 24 of all 27
participants.
Figure 3 illustrates the difference in weighting of social and private
information (SM) in belief updating. The weights given to social in-
formation (Msocial  Figure 3A, left) were credibly smaller than the
weights given to private information (Mprivate  Figure 3A, right). This
is further illustrated by the contrast Mprivate  Msocial (Figure 3B).
Thus, during belief updating, participants substantially overweighted
private as compared with social information. We also calculated the
‘information weighting index’ on the basis of the estimated parameters
of the SM for each participant. The information weighting index
(Figure 3C) was significantly negatively correlated with the ‘conformity
index’, Pearson’s product moment correlation r(25)¼0.83,
P< 0.001, suggesting that the more people overweighted private as
compared with social information, the less often they started a cascade
in the trials of interest.
fMRI results
To investigate the neural processing of social and private information
increasing uncertainty, we analyzed neural activity associated with
belief updating.
General effects of belief updating
To correctly estimate the probability of choosing the better stock, a
participant had to update her (prior) belief with every piece of infor-
mation received (social information I & II and private information).
Therefore, for the initial analysis we used a single parametric regressor
that tracked the belief updating process independent of the social or
private nature of the information (at t ¼ 2 and 3 combined). Besides
others, we found significant activity in fronto-parietal brain regions
and in the precuneus during belief updating; that is, the activity of
Fig. 2 The effect of the different levels of uncertainty signaled by social and private information on
participants’ probability judgments. An increase in objective certainty (x-axis) led to increased
probability judgments (y-axis).
Note: the dotted line indicates the prediction of the normative Bayesian model (BM) (cf. Equation 1).
The boxes range from the lower quartile to the upper quartile of the distribution. The black band in
the middle of the box represents the median. The whiskers represent the minimum and the
maximum of the distribution as long as these estimates are not further away from the median
than 1.5 Interquartile range (IQR). Circles represent outliers.
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Fig. 3 Different weighting of social and private information (SM). (A) Marginal posterior distributions for the weight of the social information (Msocial ) and for the weight of the private information (Mprivate).
(B) The contrast private information minus social information (Mprivate  Msocial ) indicates a strong difference of weighting of social and private information. (C) The distribution of the information weighting
index shows that the majority of subjects overweight private as compared with social information.
Note: The 95% Highest Density Interval (95% HDI) spans 95% of the distribution. The vertical dashed line indicates hypothetical unbiased information weighting (i.e. equal weighting of social and private information).
Table 1 Neural correlates of belief updating
Contrast Region Montreal Neurological Institute centroid
x y z Number of voxel Z value
General effects of belief updating (independent of
social and private information)
Superior temporal gyrus/inferior parietal cortex 63 49 19 221 4.83
Precuneus/posterior cingulate 3 61 34 222 4.79
Superior/middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC) 15 29 52 104 4.77
Superior temporal gyrus/inferior parietal cortex 42 61 28 229 4.54
Superior/middle frontal gyrus 21 26 46 59 3.99
Superior/medial frontal gyrus 18 53 19 35 3.87
Belief updating by social information Middle temporal gyrus 42 58 22 28 3.79
Belief updating by private information Superior/middle frontal gyrus (DLPFC)/DMPFC 48 32 19 1807 5.84
Precuneus/posterior cingulate 6 58 40 309 5.69
Inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula 48 41 14 205 5.36
Inferior parietal lobe 33 64 40 524 4.83
Inferior Parietal Lobe 48 64 43 372 4.52
Middle occipital gyrus 27 88 5 145 4.45
Middle temporal gyrus 42 52 11 161 4.41
Cerebellum 33 73 38 298 4.24
Inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula 33 20 2 108 4.17
Middle/inferior frontal gyrus 39 41 8 49 4.13
Middle occipital gyrus 36 64 11 120 4.07
Parahippocampal gyrus 21 28 11 20 3.95
Dorsal striatum 12 14 7 20 3.85
Note: P < 0.001, uncorrected with a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels.
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these regions increased with an increase in uncertainty (see Table 1,
Figure 4 for further details).
Specific effects of belief updating by social or private
information
Because our behavioral results indicated a differential processing of
private and social information, we analyzed the two main belief updat-
ing stages (social information II and private information) independ-
ently. The left middle temporal gyrus/inferior parietal lobule was active
during belief updating when subjects processed social information II
(Table 1), whereas activity of the anterior insula, the DLPFC and the
parietal cortex, besides others (Table 1 and Figure 5), correlated with
belief updating by private information.
Modulation of belief updating by individual differences in over-
weighting private information
The probability of an informational cascade starting depends on the
differential weighting of private and social information. Therefore, we
used the information weighting index to analyze how the process of
belief updating (at t ¼ 3) is modulated by interindividual differences in
information weighting. The regression analysis showed a positive cor-
relation of the belief updating activity in the inferior frontal gyrus with
the information weighting index: a similar positive correlation was
observed in the anterior insula using a more liberal threshold
(P< 0.005; uncorrected). Overall, the more participants overweighted
private as compared with social information, the more active the
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula were during belief updating of
private information (Figure 5A and Table 2). An opposite effect was
found in the parietal-temporal cortex: the more participants over-
weighted private as compared with social information, the less active
the parietal-temporal cortex was during belief updating of private in-
formation (Figure 5B and Table 2).
DISCUSSION
By combining neurobiological, economic and computational
approaches, we were able to show that people who tend to overweight
private as compared with social information show a decreased activity
in the parietal-temporal cortex and an increased activity in the inferior
frontal gyrus/anterior insula while updating their beliefs by private
information. This study illuminates the neural underpinnings of
biased belief updating by private information  the cognitive process
that is decisive for the emergence and stability of informational
cascades.
Making an optimal decision when observing other people’s deci-
sions and receiving personal (private) information as represented by
the informational cascades paradigm requires the integration of avail-
able social and private information as described by the Bayesian solu-
tion. Deviations from the Bayesian solution (e.g. overweighting of
private information) can influence subsequent decisions and therefore
the occurrence of informational cascades. It is especially important for
the theory of informational cascades to understand how the neural
process of belief updating (of private information) is modulated by
such deviations. The computational analysis of the behavioral data
showed that subjects weighted private and social information differ-
ently: the majority of subjects (24 of 27 participants) overweighted
private as compared with social information. This finding is consistent
with recent research on informational cascades: a comprehensive meta-
analysis by Weizsa¨cker (2010) showed that decision-makers often over-
weight private information even in situations in which it would be
optimal to follow others. The results of our behavioral control study
(see Supplementary Results) indicate that subjects specifically over-
weight private information, which cannot alternatively be explained
by an order-effect of overweighting recent information. Importantly,
previous studies have shown that overweighting of private information
strongly influences the emergence and stability of informational cas-
cades (Bernardo and Welch, 2001; No¨th and Weber, 2003; Goeree
et al., 2007). We also found a strong negative correlation between
the individual tendency to make conforming decisions (conformity
index) and overweighting of private information (information weight-
ing index). This clearly indicates that overweighting of private infor-
mation lowers the tendency to follow others and thereby lowers the
probability that an informational cascade starts or continues.
Our fMRI results showed that an increase in uncertainty during
belief updating by either social or private information activated the
parietal-temporal cortex  a region of the brain previously associated
with number processing (Dehaene et al., 1998, 2003). Additionally, we
found that an increase in uncertainty during belief updating by private
information activated the DMPFC, bilateral anterior insula and
DLPFC  brain regions closely linked to decision risk (for a review,
see Mohr et al., 2010). Furthermore, we demonstrated that stronger
individual overweighting of private information positively correlated
with activity in the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and negatively
with activity in the parietal-temporal cortex.
It has been shown that the inferior frontal gyrus is often co-active
with the anterior insula (Paulus et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2012) and
may constitute the so called ‘fronto-insular junction’ (Craig, 2009). In
the decision-making under risk literature, activity of the inferior fron-
tal gyrus has been related to higher risk aversion (Christopoulos et al.,
2009), an increase in positive skewness (the chance of a better than
average outcome is small) (Symmonds et al., 2011), an increase in the
variance of an outcome (uncertainty) for risk-seeking individuals
(Tobler et al., 2007), ambiguous vs. non-ambiguous gambles, especially
for ambiguity-averse individuals (Bach et al., 2011), and increasing
uncertainty (Huettel et al., 2005). Interestingly, a more posterior
region within the inferior frontal gyrus was recently found to be
more active the more improbable an event becomes as the result of
a Bayesian updating process (d’Acremont et al., 2013). Tracking of
Bayesian posterior probabilities, however, has to be differentiated
from belief updating of uncertainty, as these are two different processes
based on two different, but related, concepts (probability of occurrence
with 0 P 1 as compared with uncertainty with 0.5 P 1). How
belief updating leads to adjusted representations of posterior probabil-
ities (i.e. the outcome of the belief updating process) is not yet known.
Fig. 4 Neural correlates of belief updating by social and private information. Neural activity of the
frontal and parietal cortices increased with increasing uncertainty of the decision.
Note: P < 0.001, uncorrected with a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels.
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Fig. 5 Interindividual differences in belief updating by private information. Blue color indicates brain regions whose activity increased with increasing uncertainty during belief updating by private information.
Results of the regression analysis (red boxes) represent activity of the subregions within the inferior frontal gyrus (A) and the parietal-temporal cortex (B) that was significantly correlated with overweighting of
private information (information weighting index): the green color indicates a positive correlation, whereas the red color indicates a negative correlation. The two scatterplots display the average contrast
estimates per subject within the respective cluster plotted against the information weighting index. The dashed red line displays a linear regression model.
Note: P < 0.001, uncorrected with no minimum cluster size; brain regions in blue color (P < 0.005, uncorrected with a minimum cluster size of 20 voxels) display the explicit mask. Clusters are overlayed on a
chi2better.nii.gz template provided by MRIcron (http://www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/).
Table 2 Neural correlates of interindividual differences in overweighting private information




Inferior frontal gyrus 45 38 10 3 (11) 3.35
Inferior frontal gyrus/anterior Insula 39 17 5 (3) (2.90)
Negative correlation with
Information Weighting Index
Middle temporal gyrus 51 64 22 8 (36) 3.46
Midbrain 3 10 11 1 (3) 3.45
Middle temporal gyrus 54 2 23 1 (8) 3.38
Middle temporal gyrus 48 11 29 1 3.35
Midbrain 6 13 8 1 3.24
Middle temporal gyrus 63 31 8 1 (20) 3.13
Middle temporal gyrus 51 2 29 1 3.11
Precuneus 3 52 40 1 (14) 3.11
Middle temporal gyrus 57 31 11 1 3.10
Cerebellum 33 85 38 (8) (3.01)
Middle frontal gyrus 39 17 52 (3) (2.86)
Cerebellum 15 88 38 (3) (2.81)
Medial frontal gyrus 6 50 46 (1) (2.64)
Cerebellum 18 82 29 (1) (2.63)
Note: All results uncorrected. Two different uncorrected thresholds are reported: Z values in brackets are significant at P < 0.005 (uncorrected), whereas Z values without brackets
represent results significant at P < 0.001 (uncorrected). The number of voxels reported in brackets is significant at P < 0.005 (uncorrected), whereas the number of voxels reported
without brackets is significant at P < 0.001 (uncorrected).
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Activity in the anterior insula has been linked to risk anticipation
(Preuschoff et al., 2006; Mohr et al., 2010), prediction of risk
(Preuschoff et al., 2008), risk-aversion mistakes (Kuhnen and
Knutson, 2005), intolerance of uncertainty (Simmons et al., 2008),
risk during the selection of the potential behavioral responses
(Huettel, 2006) and to the integration of subjective risk preference
(Symmonds et al., 2011). Activity of the insular cortex has also been
associated with the degree of harm avoidance (Paulus et al., 2003) and
choice strategies that try to minimize losses (Venkatraman et al., 2009).
Thus, we can speculate that the stronger uncertainty-related activity of
the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula during the processing of pri-
vate information conflicting with social information can overcome the
effects of social conformity in subjective estimates of uncertainty.
However, according to the computational model (SM) overweight-
ing of private information changes the posterior probability and
thereby uncertainty. Thus, increased uncertainty could potentially ex-
plain increased activation of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula
in participants who strongly overweighted private information. To
examine this explanation we determined whether overweighting of
private information indeed increased uncertainty. The (un-)certainty
measured as the average absolute difference between the posterior
probability and a pure chance prediction of 0.5 across all trials was
nearly the same for the SM with 0.2627 and the standard model (BM)
with 0.2602. Therefore, overweighting of private information did not
on average increase uncertainty and can be ruled out as an explanation
for the increased activity of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula.
Instead, it appears plausible that people who are very sensitive to cues
associated with uncertainty as reflected in increased activity of the
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula tend to overweight private infor-
mation. Overall, our results further support the important role of the
anterior insula in the neural mechanism of social influence on human
behavior (Klucharev et al., 2009; Berns et al., 2010; Campbell-
Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Izuma and Adolphs, 2013).
The parietal-temporal cortex was active at all stages of belief updat-
ing (by social and private information). Importantly, activity of the
parietal-temporal cortex was modulated by interindividual differences
in the weighting of private information: stronger overweighting of
private information was associated with decreased activity in the par-
ietal-temporal cortex during the final stage of belief updating. Previous
human and nonhuman studies consistently associated the parietal cor-
tices with number processing (Dehaene et al., 1998, 2003) and with the
resolution of uncertainty in tasks with limited knowledge about the
correct action to take (Volz et al., 2003, 2004; Huettel et al., 2005, 2006;
Kiani and Shadlen, 2009; Symmonds et al., 2011). Our results suggest
that people with stronger numerical processing of private information
in the parietal cortices are less biased toward private information and
estimate uncertainty closer to the Bayesian optimal solution; however,
this makes them more prone to start an informational cascade. Overall,
we suggest a 2-fold neural mechanism of overweighting of private
information in informational cascades: (i) increased activity of the
inferior frontal gyrus/anterior insula and (ii) decreased activity in
the parietal-temporal cortex. At a later stage during decision-making,
these two neural signals could be integrated via the direct anatomical
connection between insula and posterior parietal cortex (Cavada and
Goldman-Rakic, 1989). Further experiments are needed to explore this
hypothesis.
We found a large overlap of activations evoked by increased uncer-
tainty during belief updating by private information and during deci-
sion-making (see supplementary fMRI results). In both time windows,
we observed uncertainty-related activity of the DMPFC, anterior
insula, parietal cortex and DLPFC. A meta-analysis by Mohr et al.
(2010) showed that these brain regions are more strongly activated
for decision risk as compared with anticipation risk. In our task, all
relevant information was already available after the presentation of
private information. Therefore, participants had the opportunity to
form a decision (i.e. select a stock) before the response cue. Thus, in
our task it is difficult to differentiate the neural effects related to belief
updating and decision-making at the last stages of a trial. Interestingly,
in contrast to Stern et al. (2010), we did not find activity in the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex during belief updating in general (even when
using a very low uncorrected threshold of 0.10). This discrepancy
could be caused by the differences in the statistical analysis and/or
design of the two studies. In contrast to our study, participants in
the evidence accumulation task used by Stern et al. (2010) (i) rated
uncertainty after each of the information cues, (ii) received only pri-
vate information, (iii) received a feedback after every trial and (iv) had
the opportunity to decline a decision. Behrens et al. (2008) showed
that the anterior cingulate gyrus is involved in social learning.
However, to clarify the exact role of the anterior cingulate cortex in
belief updating further studies are needed. Additional studies will also
help to generalize the observed mechanisms to different social envir-
onments. In particular, we used a decision scenario in which partici-
pants inferred information from hypothetical behavior of others.
Therefore, it appears necessary to examine situations in which social
information is inferred from real behavior of other people in the
future.
Taken together, we show that private information conflicting with
social information activates brain regions associated with risk and un-
certainty. Furthermore, activity of the inferior frontal gyrus/anterior
insula and the parietal-temporal cortex were modulated by interindi-
vidual differences in the overweighting of private information. The
behavioral results indicate that such interindividual differences can
influence the probability that a cascade starts. By and large, our results
suggest a profound role of the uncertainty-related neural activity in the
formation of informational cascades.
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